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The theory, models and architectures of intelligent agents
are based loosely on the theory of intentions from Bratman
resulting in the so-called BDI agents. Although this func-
tions well for single agents it has been long recognized that
this approach falls short for multi-agent systems. It lacks
appropriate social aspects to make natural interaction pos-
sible. The original concept for intelligent agents was based
on a (simple) idea of how people reason about actions. We
propose that we go back to the foundation and acknowledge
that people are in the core social beings. I.e. we don’t func-
tion as rational agents with the addition of some “sociality”
modules to make us aware of other people. Rather we are
social at the base and this sociality pervades all our reason-
ing, motivation, and any other aspect of our behavior. In
this paper we propose a new set of core cognitive elements
to replace the BDI approach and discuss the paradigm of
a social landscape. However, although we aim for a radi-
cal change in the way the community creates social agents
we also believe that the new approach incorporates previous
work, such as BDI. Our claim is that deliberation about ac-
tions and BDI are certainly a part of how agents cope with
a dynamic world, but are not the core part of social agents
that are part of a social world interacting with other agents
and humans in a natural way.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years we have seen a growing demand of more
realistic social behavior of (multi-)agent systems. Last year
Kaminka ([7]) has appealed to cure robots from their autism.
We also saw a (renewed) interest in the human-agent interac-
tion (although sometimes forgetting the work done in other
communities, such as, the intelligent virtual agents and the
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human-robot interaction communities), because agents are
more and more seen as partners for humans rather than
tools. In (serious) gaming the use of agents to implement
characters seems intuitive, but also requires a believable so-
cial behavior from these characters both in their mutual
interaction as well as in their interaction with the player.
In social simulation the use of agents also becomes com-
mon place as a way of modeling individuals and generating
emerging behavioral patterns.
However, in all of these application areas we see a rapid
increase and then a decline of interest in agent technology.
For a large part this seems to be due to the fact that cur-
rent agent technology is not geared towards implementing
truly, realistic social behavior. For most applications exist-
ing technology is then extended in order to cover the miss-
ing elements. Often this leads to complex architectures that
work well for specific applications but whose validity is hard
to assess. See [11] for an example in agents for games and
[2, 3] for social robotics.
As said before, just stating that agents are social because
they have a communication language or can be programmed
to work in a team does not make the agents social. The agent
theory will have to support the design and implementation
of social behavior in a better and more fundamental way.
There are (at least) two issues that need to be investigated
to accomplish this:
1. allow for social motivations. i.e. motivations to reach
a social rather than a practical goal.
2. recognize that all actions have both practical and social
effects that have to be modeled and accounted for.
The above two issues play an important role when try-
ing to model social interactions. I.e. interactions other
than fixed protocols. What can/should agents expect from
each other? How do they reason about the interaction? If
(as nowadays becomes more common) the interaction is de-
scribed using norms, when do agents follow the norm or
violate it? E.g. A reviewer has to deliver her review before
November 25. Why do reviewers comply with this rule? Do
they calculate the utilities and comply if the benefits out-
weigh the costs of complying? In that case many reviewers
should be late, because the time investment is large and the
explicit benefits of complying (against punishment when be-
ing late) are minimal.
In general though it seems that reviewers will follow the
norm, because it is a norm and as long as most reviewers fol-
low it. They follow it because they want to be a respectable
member of the PC. In special situations they will override
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this with situation dependent arguments often with a social
character to violate the norm. Those reasons can be e.g.
that a partner had to go to hospital in the reviewing period.
However, an excuse of having to go to a party is usually not
accepted.
It might become clear that we need to model and take
into account a whole range of social aspects and motives to
model social interactions in a realistic way. This in turn
would be needed in order to show realistic social behavior
in e.g. robots, games and social simulations.
In the rest of this paper we will expand upon the vision of
creating truly social agents and the consequences and bene-
fits of embarking upon this road.
2. INGREDIENTS
Social Motives
As we argued that in order to create truly social agents
we need to start at the basis of the agent motivation again
and build sociality from the core it makes sense to look at
theories of human motivations (again). One of the most
influential theories on basic human motivations is that of
McClelland [10]. He argues that there are a number of ba-
sic natural incentives that give rise to some motives. These
motives can be considered as being the core of “energizing”
subsequent action. Besides the biological (homeostatic) mo-
tives such as hunger and need for sleep (which are, in fact,
not very salient in most of the social situations), McClelland
distinguishes four motives: (1) achievement, (2) power, (3)
affiliation and (4) avoidance.
Most of the agents based on the BDI paradigm are implic-
itly using only the first type of motive (achievement). Based
on their beliefs of the current situation they try to create a
plan (and execute it) to achieve a goal state. However, the
achievement motive also includes less practical, and more
social, aspects that are not considered in agents, such as,
to try to achieve a certain position or reputation in a so-
cial group (e.g. to be the most popular or most helpful). In
other words, to achieve goals in the state of the social world.
The power motive is about trying to have an impact on
the world and reach a sense of control. For people it leads to
behavior that tries to change the physical world just in order
to see that one has the capability to do that, but is also used
to impact the social context in which people live. Thus, it
leads to attempts to influence other people and engaging in
status and power manoeuvres with others. It is a very social
motive, even though one might not think of persons using
(abusing) their power as being “social”.
The affiliation motive drives people to seek the company
of other people. However, it is not just the company of other
people that is needed, but rather to establish and maintain
positive interactions (relation) with those people. Therefore,
one wants positive interactions that give emotional rewards
to all parties involved and lead to further interactions. So,
both the quality as well as the quantity of the interactions
influence the satisfaction of the need for affiliation.
Finally, the avoidance motive drives people to avoid con-
flicting and/or bad situations. Thus, if interactions with
another person are not pleasant, e.g. leading to high lev-
els of anxiety and discomfort, one will withdraw and avoid
future interactions with that person. The motive also is ac-
tive in a broader sense that it tries to avoid situations in
which there is a large difference between the perceived and
expected situation. That is, situations with a large cognitive
dissonance. It leads to self preservation, seeking certainty,
and emotional regulation, which fosters the categorization
and simplification of behavior so that it becomes more stan-
dardized (and thus predictable).
Taking these four basic human motives as starting point
has a number of important consequences. Although we do
not have the space here to explain all details of the relations
between the motives one can easily see that they constitute a
balanced system with approach and avoidance mechanisms.
E.g. where the power motive can lead one to seek domi-
nance over other people, the affiliation motive makes sure
that this is not done at all costs and is kept within “socially
acceptable” bounds. In the same way the achievement mo-
tive leads to people to explore new ways to achieve goals,
but the avoidance motive takes care that we avoid too much
deviation from known situations. Thus, having a system
of basic motives like this supports a flexible and situational
guidance of agents in a dynamic social context.
Identity
Making the agent social has implications on how it perceives
itself and the world. People position themselves, and oth-
ers, in terms of membership of social groups (i.e. reference
groups) and social goals are often based on comparison with
others. For example, if you want to be an influential AA-
MAS researcher this means that you identify yourself (at
least partly) as an “AAMAS researcher” and you need to
know the position and activities of some (prototypical/ideal)
AAMAS researchers such that you can ascertain what kind
of action is needed to become respected in that group. Peo-
ple will usually identify themselves as part of several refer-
ence groups. Some of these groups are quite stable, such as
family and profession while others are more volatile, such
as the group of people in a shop or at a party. People
have different emotional attachments to each of the social
groups, which elicits social goals to maintain and pursue
certain identities.
It may seem that maintaining an agent identity creates
quite some overhead, but this is not actually true. The
reference groups come with roles structure, values, norms
and prototypical behaviors that can be used to make quick
decisions and take action in situations where the group is
salient.
Skills
In the above we have emphasized the core social aspects
that should be part of models for social agents. It does
not mean that social agents do not also have more indi-
vidual attributes. One such attribute is the set of skills
(or capabilities) that an agent has to perform actions. We
assume that different agents have different (although possi-
bly overlapping) sets of skills. The complementarity of the
skills leads to dependencies and the need for cooperation to
achieve goals. The skills also influence the reference groups
that an agent will consider to be part of. If its skills are
in high demand in a reference group it will get more recog-
nition (and status) from that reference group. The agent
may use a skill just to get the emotional reward of receiving
status. On the other hand, the agent may have the skill but
not the motivation to use it at its maximum potential.
Values
Another core aspect of individual agents is the set of values
and their priorities. Many definitions of values exist and
many research communities use them in different ways. We
see them as criteria with which pairs of situations can be
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ordered. E.g. the value “environmental friendly” can be
used to compare two situations on the basis of how well the
nature is preserved in each of them. It can very well be that
another value, such as, “comfort” will sort the two situations
exactly the other way around. What the person will judge
to be the most preferred situation in that case depends on
the priority he gives to the values, which can be determined
by meta-norms and culture. The ordered set of values of an
agent will thus determine its basic preferences for types of
situations.
The set of values of an agent is also used to reconcile the
set of values of different reference groups the agent belongs
to. This is needed for an agent to behave in a consistent
(and expected) way even though it functions as member of
different groups. We argue that the very abstract level of
values is needed to make this comparison, rather than be-
haviors or even norms, because the groups usually function
in different contexts which makes comparing behaviors and
norms quite difficult, while the values can be used across
wider contexts.
Social reality
Agents will still have their model (knowledge and beliefs) of
the world. As already argued by Kaminka [7], social intel-
ligence needs recognition of other agents and fundamental
understanding of those agents. This is only possible if an
agent maintains a model of the others and the history of
interaction with them, including the attitudes they present
toward others (e.g. status conferrals [8]). However, we do
not believe that an agent needs to have a fully detailed model
of the mind of each agent it encounters. In many situations
it suffices to have a simple model of the role the other agent
plays in the reference group and context in which the agents
meet. E.g. when we interact with a shopkeeper we (usually)
use a model of a generic shopkeeper from which we extract
that she will have information about the products in the
shop and will be able to assist in buying a product. It also
should be enough to store only the most relevant interaction
events (e.g. those that generate more emotional arousal).
Another important aspect to take into account is that not
all details of social reality are salient at the same time. For
example, we may use the identity of AAMAS researcher at
the AAMAS conference room, but later, at dinner with the
very same people we may use a reference group based on
friendship and drop the researcher “attitudes”.
3. SOCIAL LANDSCAPE
In order for agents to plan for social goals it will be nec-
essary to create some structure in the social reality that
the agent perceives and tries to navigate in. One way to
start doing this is through the creation of a social landscape
as a social counterpart of the physical landscape. It seems
rather trivial to talk about the social world as a landscape.
However, we often refer to social relations in physical terms.
E.g. “me and my brother are really close”, “we don’t see
eye to eye” or “she is of a higher class”. Thus, we seem
to think about our social relations in terms of a physical
space. This idea is taken a step further by some work from
one of the founders of social psychology Kurt Lewin, who
talks about principles of topological psychology [9] and by
psychotherapists that use physical positions of patients and
their relations to get insights into their problems [6].
In a social landscape we position an agent in an environ-
ment that indicates the social value of different situations
and agents. The landscape is subjective and thus different
for each individual agent. Situations that are socially very
desirable for the agent might be thought of as lying up-
wards, while undesirable situations lay more down. Close-
ness in this social landscape indicates social similarity. Thus,
agents that are socially similar are in close proximity. Social
interactions denote movements in the landscape. Successful
(or positive) interactions can tighten the social ties between
agents and move them closer together. Note that getting
closer to an agent does not always mean that one gets in an
overall more preferred social situation. Because agents that
you want to be close to, of course, also have interactions with
other agents they might be a moving target. Therefore, one
should not just have positive interactions with such an agent
but also frequent interactions in order to update the relation
and keep in the neighborhood. This idea is confirmed by re-
ality where not only the character of the interactions but
also the frequency matters for keeping a good relation.
The above paragraph only briefly sketches some of the
possibilities of using a social landscape metaphor. One of
the prime reasons to use such a metaphor is that it enforces
in a very natural way some basic social consistencies. It also
facilitates the reuse of algorithms that have been used to
move and plan objects and agents in a physical world. How-
ever, we have presented social interactions in this section as
if they only have an effect in the social landscape. Reality
is more complex. We only have interactions that have both
a physical and social effect. Here, with “physical effect” we
refer to functional effects in the agent environment. This
can be, for example, a bid in an auction or an update of
a database or choosing the distance, facing and speed while
approaching another agent. Every social interaction needs to
be performed through such physical interactions and, thus,
social interactions also have physical effects (and vice-versa).
E.g. small talk in a pub is meant to maintain social rela-
tions. However, it means that the person has to go to the
pub, possibly spend some money and time there. So, the
social interaction also has physical repercussions. We see
this connection between physical and social reality as one of
the challenges to create social agents.
4. COMPUTATIONAL MODELS
Creating a social landscape to structure the social reality
for an agent is one way to operationalize some of the social
aspects an agent has to monitor and navigate. Given all
the (social) aspects that social agents have to consider we
claim that it is no longer effective to use a deliberation cycle
based on that of BDI type agents. E.g. it is not the case
that we can start with the basic motives of an agent, choose
the most salient one for the current moment and then plan
some actions based on values and goals. Basic motives in-
fluence the choices of the agent at many different points in
the deliberation. In the other hand, values are certainly not
always explicitly considered when constructing plans. They
are often implicit in determining the set of possible plans
under consideration.
The above considerations indicate that a traditional fixed
deliberation loop through all modules is not effective nor
leads to realistic social behavior. So, what alternative can
be used? Based on psychological literature [10, 1, 5] it seems
a kind of subsumption architecture [4] should be used. In
most social situations people do not engage in deep cognitive
thinking. This means that different levels of deliberation
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should take place depending on the situation. E.g. when
getting hungry and it is around 12:30 an agent goes to the
canteen when at work. Basically, this can be seen as a simple
trigger-action pair (or heuristic). It is enforced by habit and
the fact that (most) other agents also go to the canteen at
that time (thus, driven by the affiliation motive). The struc-
ture of social reality provides means to support short-cuts
for fast adequate decision making (e.g. by means of norms),
but, in addition, we need a good mechanism to evaluate the
relevance and salience of a situation that implies a more
careful deliberation (e.g. in some cases it is important to
violate a norm to support a value that is important in the
group).
In general, motives are primary drivers that are always
considered when a trigger arrives from the environment.
Values are cognitive components that are considered when
a cognitive choice has to be made about the course of action
to follow. In each case there might be goals involved if sev-
eral courses of action can be chosen that are equally good
with respect to the motive and/or value. Thus we have the
traditional goals and plans if needed. Values are often used
off-line to connect or prioritize certain types of actions and
plans for goals. They will more often be explicitly used when
choices have to be made about actions that have long term
(or possible irreversible) consequences. E.g. buying a house,
choosing a career, etc.
In our opinion current agent models lack important in-
gredients. However, a careful reader will have noticed that
our proposed ingredients do incorporate the traditional BDI
components, but placed in richer contexts rather than hav-
ing added some extra (social) modules to the BDI model.
However, it seems clear that the complexity of adding social
reality to agents requires a new type of layered deliberation
cycle for the agents rather than the traditional BDI deliber-
ation cycle.
5. LET’S GET SOCIAL
We have sketched a grand vision of social agents. The
vision is based on some fundamental social aspects from hu-
man psychology. Most of these aspects have not been con-
sidered yet in a principled way by agent research. The main
message is that we cannot just add a few “social” modules to
the existing BDI architectures to create social agents. We
need to start with a fresh look and build social agents based
on social modules. In order to create these social modules
we will need to investigate more closely how the social as-
pects function and how they relate together. Then we can
build a theory that can be used to create architectures and
implementations of these social agents. Only then can we
also see how much of the work on social aspects of agents
that already exists can be used and integrated in a consistent
way.
Considering the amount of work involved in the above
steps, one might wonder whether the results will ever war-
rant the investment. We really believe they will! Of course,
not all agent systems need all the social aspects that we have
outlined in this vision. However, having a grounded theory
for social agents it is also possible to show how to select
those parts that are needed for situations in which a num-
ber of social aspects don’t play a role. This will facilitate
the compatibility of these agent systems with agent systems
that do contain social agents because one can explicitly see
which parts should be taken for granted.
It also facilitates later extensions of agent systems with
new social aspects. A good example from the past is adding
norms to agent systems. Norms are essential social con-
structs. Because most agent systems lack the required social
aspects to implement all elements of norms, the norms have
been implemented in many different (ad-hoc) ways. As a
consequence it is unclear (and sometimes counter intuitive)
how the resulting normative agent system functions.
Finally, a good theory and architecture for social agents
might be a basis for connecting different agent communi-
ties again. E.g., research performed on intelligent virtual
agents seems remote from research done on game theoretic
interactions or agent based social simulations. By creat-
ing a broader theoretical framework it is possible to show
where interesting connections exist and that disparate re-
search results arise from concentrating on different aspects
of the social agent. This will open up opportunities for new
applications of agents and collaborations between different
communities.
We know that the challenge of creating real social agents
is a large one. But we are convinced that the rewards will
be equally large. Therefore, we already embarked on this
adventure and hope this paper convinced you to join us!
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